Abstract
Introduction
When building a multiagent system, a designer (or a group of designers) has to worry about two issues: mechanism design (which dictates the way that agents interact), and individual-agent design. Of course, these two design issues are interdependent; a well-designed mechanism can simplify the design of individual agents (and vice versa). For instance, Vickery's auction mechanism (Vickery, 1961) makes rational agents bid their true reservation prices such that even self-interested agents, if they are rational, will 0-8186-8500-X/98 $10.00 0 1998 IEEE behave honestly (and not try in vain to outsmart other agents)'.
However, designing a good mechanism that exhibits certain properties-which is called incentive engineering or mechanism design (Rosenschein & Zlotkin, 1 9 9 4 t i s difficult, especially for dynamic systems where the participants and their interactions evolve over time. The example of such dynamic systems that we use throughout this paper is the University of Michigan Digital Library (UMDL). In the UMDL project, we aim to provide an infrastructure for rendering library services in a networked information environment (Durfee et aZ., 1998) . We have designed the UMDL as a multiagent system, where agents (representing users, collections, and services of the digital library) sell and buy information goods and services through auctions. While supporting flexibility and scalability, the open multiagent architecture and market infrastructure create dynamics (agents participating in an auction change, matches between buyers and sellers vary, and auctions themselves evolve), which adds additional complexity to mechanism design.
As system architects, we strive for an efficient system. Although the UMDL market allows the self-interested agents to seek profits, we do not want strategic agents to undermine the overall system performance (efficiency in market), nor such agents to reap profits against other agents (efficiency in allocation). That is, we want an incentivecompatible mechanism that makes strategic reasoning unnecessary (Zlotkin & Rosenschein, 1996; Wellman, 1993) . Unfortunately, we do not have such a mechanism yet for the UMDL system; we fully expect strategic agents who try to take advantage of other agents to emerge in the system. So, does it mean the UMDL will become inefficient? Will (and should) a UMDL agent spend much of its computational power trying to outsmart other agents? What happens if all the agents behave strategically? In this paper, we answer the above questions, by studying the properties of the UMDL with strategic agents. Instead of developing a ' Vickery's auction mechanism may be inappropriate for certain settings. For limitations of Vickery auctions, see the work by Sandholm (Sandholm, 1996) . mechanism that prevents strategic thinking (which is hard), we use a bottom-up approach: we design a strategy that the UMDL agents may use and experiment with such strategic agents to learn about the system properties. In particular, we are interested in whether making strategic reasoning ubiquitous (instead of preventing it) reduces its negative effects.
In the following, we review some of the previous work on multiagent system design issues and briefly describe the target system, the UMDL service market society. We explain a strategy called p-strategy and demonstrate its advantages over other simpler strategies. Then, by experimenting with multiple p-strategy agents, we investigate some emergent properties of the UMDL system.
Related Work
A multiagent system can be designed to exhibit certain desirable properties. A single designer (or a group of designers sharing common goals) can calibrate the system to follow its goals (Briggs & Cook, 1995; Shoham & Tennenholtz, 1995) . For instance, agents and mechanism can be built in certain ways (e.g., share information, be honest, and so on) conducive to cooperation. Social laws and conventions, however, are unsuitable for the UMDL where agent designers do not share common goals and system architects cannot impose limitations on the individual, self-interested agents.
When designing multiagent systems with self-interested agents, many researchers have turned to game theory to lead systems to desired behaviors (e.g., discourage agents from spending time and computation trying to take advantage of others) (Sandholm & Lesser, 1995; Brafman & Tennenholtz, 1996) . For instance, Rosenschein and Zlotkin have identified two building blocks of a multiagent system, protocol and strategy (which are mechanism and individual agent in our terminology, respectively), and focused on designing a protocol which "...motivates agents towards telling the truth ..." (Rosenschein & Zlotkin, 1994) .
Unfortunately, game theory tends to be applied to highly abstract and simplified settings. We do not use game theory because the UMDL is too complex to model and because we cannot assume rationality in agents.
Another approach to designing multiagent systems with self-interested agents is to let manipulation from agents happen and live with it. This may sound like bad engineering, but preventing strategic behavior of individual agents is unrealistic for many complex systems. Instead, by studying how the individual, strategic agents impact the overall system behavior, we gain insights on properties of agent societies, such as characterizing the types of environments and agent populations that foster social and anti-social behavior (Vidal & Durfee, 1996; Hu & Wellman, 1996) . Our approach falls into this category, and our goal is to explain how strategic agents affect the UMDL in terms of market and allocation efficiency.
The UMDL Service Market Society
The UMDL Service Market Society (SMS) is a marketbased multiagent system where agents buy and sell goods and services from each other. Instead of relying solely on internally-designed agents, UMDL can attract outside agents to provide new services, who are motivated by the long-term profit they might accrue by participating in the system. Since the UMDL is open, we treat all agents as selfish.
Selling and buying of services are done through auction markets, operated by auction agents. Figure 1 shows an example of the UMDL auction, where User Interface Agents (UIAs) want to find sources of information for some topic (say, science) on behalf of certain kinds of users (say, high school), and some Query Planning Agents (QPAs) sell the services for finding such collections. Due to space limitations, we ignore the issues of how to describe what agents buy or sell, how to locate the right auction to participate in, when and how to create an auction, and so on. Interested readers may refer to (Durfee et al., 1998) .
At present, the UMDL uses the AuctionBot software (Mullen 8% Wellman, 1996) Compared to double auctions used in some economic models (Friedman and Rust, 1993) , the UMDL auction is a continuously-clearing double auction, well-suited for frequent, timely transactions needed in information economies. In the UMDL auction, a transaction is completed as soon as a buy offer and a sell offer cross (without waiting for the remaining agents to submit their bids), and the clearing price is determined for each transaction (rather than being set at some medium price among bids). In the UMDL, the auction agent continuously matches the highest buyer to the lowest seller, given that the buy price is greater than the sell price. The clearing price is based on the seller's offer price (Le., consumers receive all the surplus).
Since buyers (sellers) with bid prices higher (lower) than any standing sell (buy) offer get matched, the buyers in the auction (if any) always have lower offer prices than the sellers (if any). That is, standing offers ordered by lowest to highest bid are always in a (bbb ... bsss ... s) sequence, as shown in Figure 2 . To manage the size of the auction, we may limit the standing offers in the auction. The auction used in our experiments limits the number of buy and sell offers not to exceed five each. When an additional buyer (seller) arrives, the seller (buyer) with the highest (lowest) offer will be kicked out first.
A Strategy based on Stochastic Modeling
Agents placed in the UMDL SMS want to maximize their profits by increasing the possible matches and the profit per match. In this section, we present a bidding strategy that agents may use to maximize their profits, and examine the performance of the seller' with such a strategy against other types of sellers.
The p-strategy
We have developed an agent strategy (called p-strategy) that finds the best offer price for the multiagent auction (Park, Durfee & Birmingham, 1996) . The four-step pstrategy is as follows. First, the agent models the auction process using a Markov chain (MC) with two absorbing states (success and failure). Secondly, it computes the transition probabilities between the MC states. Thirdly, it computes the probabilities and the payoffs of success and failure. Finally, it finds the best offer price to maximize its expected utility.
The main idea behind the p-strategy is to capture the factors which influence the expected utility in the MC model of the auction process. For instance, the seller is likely to raise its offer price when there are many buyers or when it expects more buyers to come. The MC model takes those factors into account in the MC states and the transition probabilities. The number of buyers and sellers at the auction, the arrival rates of future buyers and sellers, and the distribution of buy and sell prices are among the identified factors.
Each state in the MC model represents the status of the auction. The (bbss*) state, for example, represents the case where there are 2 standing buy offers and 2 standing sell offers and the sell offer of the p-strategy agent (represented as s*) is higher than the other seller's offer. If we assume that offers arrive at most one at a time, the auction can go to any of the following states from the (bbss") state (see Figure 3) . Since sellers have a somewhat stronger incentive to be strategic in the UMDL, as they set the clearing price and this affects their tradeoff between the probability of trading and the profit earned, we use the p-strategy seller (instead of buyer). with a maximum size of five buyers and sellers each3. In this paper, we skip how to define the exact transition probabilities between the MC states (step 2), how to compute the probabilities and the payoffs of success and failure (step 3), and how to find the best payment (step 4).
Readers may refer to (Park, Durfee & Birmingham, 1996) . Using the MC model and its transition probabilities, the p-strategy agent is able to capture various factors that influence the utility value and tradeoffs associated with the factors. Figure 5 shows an example of tradeoffs between the number of buyers and sellers. In general, the seller raises its offer price when there are more buyers (to increase the profit of a possible match). When the number of sellers is five (at the right end of the graph), however, the p-strategy seller bids a lower price when there is one buyer than when there is no buyer. That is, the p-strategy seller lowers its offer to increase the probability of a match (instead of increasing the profit of a match). Offering a higher price in this case would have served to price it out of the auction when it might otherwise have been able to trade profitably.
Intuitively, agents with complete models of other agents will always do better, but without repeated encounters complete models are unattainable. In the UMDL, an agent in its lifetime meets many different agents, and as a result its model of other agents is incorrect, imprecise, and incomplete. Instead of modeling individual agents, the pThe number of MC states increases with the size of the auction. When the maximum number of standing offers is limited to rn buyers and tz sellers, the number of MC states is (rn+l)x((n+l)xn)/2+2. Of course, one may shrink the size of the MC model, while sacrificing the accuracy of the model. The p-strategy is an optimal strategy, provided that the MC model represents the auction process correctly and that all the agents have the same level of knowledge. Obviously, the p-strategy is not optimal when its model is incorrect (i.e., incorrect knowledge), and the p-strategy agent can be exploited by competing agents who know about the p-strategy (i.e., higher-level knowledge).
Advantages of p-strategy
In this section, we demonstrate the advantages of the pstrategy in the UMDL auction, comparing the profit of the p-strategy seller (p-QPA) with three different types of sellers. They are: 
Buyers
A single agent simulates multiple buyers by submitting multiple bids. In our experiments, every 6 seconds the buyer submits its bid with a probability of 0.8. By adjusting the offer interval and the offer rate of the single buyer, we can change the arrival rate of buy offers to the auction'. The buyer offers valuations drawn randomly from a uniform distribution between 10 and 30.
0

Sellers
For each experiment, we compare the profits of two sellers: p-QPA and the opponent (either FM-QPA, ZI-QPA, or CP-QPA). Both sellers submit their bids every 24 seconds on average. In addition, similar to the buyer case, a single agent simulates all the other sellers at the auction. Its offer interval and offer rate are set at 12 and 0.8, respectively.
The costs of all the sellers are based on their loads, which are computed from the message traffic and the current workload. That is, cost = a x (number of messages per minute) + p x (number of matches per minute).
The cost function represents economies of scale. Since the workload from matches should be higher than that from A seller who bids its cost plus some fixed markup (FM-QPA), A seller who bids its cost plus some random markup (ZI-QPA)4, A seller who bids the clearing price of the next transaction (CP-QPA).
ZI stands for zero-intelligence. The ZI-QPA is a "budgetconstrained zero-intelligence trader" who generates random bids subject to a no-loss constraint (Gode & Sunder, 1993) . Arrival-rate-of-buy-offers E (offer-rate/offer-interval) x clearing-interval. The arrival rate varies, however, since the agent is allowed to submit a new offer immediately after a match even when it hasn't reached the next offer interval. communication, we set a to 1, and p to 5 for our experiments.
In the first set of experiments, we have compared the profits of the p-QPA and the FM-QPA. When competing with FM-QPAs with various markups, the p-QPA always gets a higher profit. This is not surprising, since the p-QPA is able to use extra information about the auction. Figure  &(a) shows the accumulated profits of the p-QPA and the FM-QPA who bids its cost plus 7 as its offer (i.e., fixedmarkup = 7). Figure 6 -(b) shows the profits of the p-QPA and the ZI-QPA. The ZI-QPA works poorly against the p-QPA, which indicates the randomization strategy does not work. The ZI-QPA can be thought of as an extremely naive strategy that fails to take advantage of a given situation (Gode & Sunder, 1993) .
In the final experiment, we have compared the p-QPA with the CP-QPA. The CP-QPA receives a price quote from the auction-the clearing price were the auction to clear at the time of the quote-and submits it as its offer as long as it is higher than its cost. Note that the clearing price is a hypothetical one, so it will change when new offer(s) arrive during the time between the clearing-price quote and the CP-QPA's offer.
As shown in Figure W c ) , the p-QPA usually gets a higher profit when competing with the CP-QPA. Since the CP-QPA gets more matches than the p-QPA (but its profit per match is smaller) on average, however, the CP-QPA works better when getting more matches does not impact its cost much (e.g., when p is 0). Bidding the next clearing price may seem like a good heuristic, but the profit of the CP-QPA decreases rapidly when there is another CP-QPA, since it no longer gets as many matches as when there is a single CP-QPA.
The p-strategy works well in the UMDL auction due to its dynamics. No agent can have a complete, deterministic view about the current and future status of the auction, and naturally, an agent strategy should be able to take into account the dynamics and the resulting uncertainties. In our experiments, the p-strategy which models the auction process stochastically receives higher profit than the other strategies.
Session
(1) (2) (3) (4) ( 5 ) (6)
In our previous paper (Park, Durfee, and Birmingham, 1996) , we have shown the advantages of the p-strategy in the domain of multiagent contracts with possible retraction. In this paper, we have demonstrated that the p-strategy works well in the new domain. Note that we have used the p-strategy seller (compared to the p-strategy buyer in the previous paper).
Bidding strategy Description
Seller1 Seller2 Seller3 Seller4 Seller5 Seller6 Seller7
All competitive sellers C C C C C C C 1 p-strategy seller C C C C C C P 2 p-strategy sellers C C C C C P P 3 p-strategy sellers C C C C P P P 5 p-strategy sellers C C P P P P P All p-strategy sellers P P P P P P P
Collective Behavior of p-strategy Agents in the UMDL Auction
Given that the p-strategy is effective in the UMDL auction (from the previous section), nothing prohibits any selfinterested agent from adopting the p-strategy. We expect many p-strategy agents to coexist in the UMDL, and thus are interested in the collective behavior of such agents. In this section, therefore, we investigate (1) how the absolute and relative performance of a p-strategy agent changes against other p-strategy agents, and (2) how the UMDL is affected by multiple p-strategy agents. Figure 7 shows six experimental settings with 7 buyers and 7 sellers. Although we fix the number of buyers and sellers to seven each, by changing the offer rates and the offer intervals, we can simulate a large number of agents and different levels of activities in the auction. By increasing the offer rates or decreasing the offer intervals, for instance, we can simulate a more dynamic auction.
Experimental Setting
In our experiments, we deliberately set supply to be higher than demand to emphasize competition among sellers; each buyer submits its bid every 30 seconds with a probability of 0.5, while the offer interval and the offer rate of each seller are set to 30 seconds and a probability of 0.7, respectively.
The buyers bid their true valuations, while the sellers bid their sell prices based on their strategies. In Session 1, all seven sellers bid their true costs. Since traders honestly report their reservation prices, Session 1 gets the most matches and serves as a benchmark for comparing market efficiency. From Session 2 through Session 6, we introduce more p-strategy agents into the auction.
Efficiency of the system is measured in two ways. First, we measure the efficiency of allocation, by comparing the p-strategy agent's absolute and relative profits. Second, we measure the efficiency of the market, using the number of matches made and the total profit generated.
Experimental Results
Although we have shown that the p-strategy agent has an upper hand over other-strategy agents, this observation may not hold in the presence of other p-strategy agents. To test this, we compare the profits of Seller 7 (p-strategy agent) across Sessions 2 to 6. As shown in Figure 8 , the marginal profit of the p-strategy (smart) agent decreases as the number of p-strategy (equally smart) agents increases. Now that we have established the fact that the profit of the p-strategy agent decreases as more agents use pstrategy, another question arises. How will a simpler strategy agent perform in the presence of multiple pstrategy agents? In Figure 9 , by replacing Seller 1 with the fixed-markup QPA (with markup = 5), we measure the relative performance of the FM-QPA and the p-QPA. The FM-QPA's profit is generally less than that of the p-QPA, but the difference decreases with the increase of p-strategy agents6. That is, the disadvantages of being less smart decreases as the number of smart agents increases.
The result indicates that an agent may want to switch between using p-strategy and using a simpler strategy depending on what the other agents are doing. By dynamicallly switching to a simpler strategy, an agent can
The FM-QPA's profit exceeds that of the p-QPA in Session 5 (in Figure 9 ), but at present we cannot conclude whether this is statistically significant. In terms of market efficiency, we first measure the number of total transactions made at the auction, as shown in Figure 10 . When the number of p-strategy agents increases, the number of matches decreases, since the pstrategy agents usually get fewer matches but more profit per match. In addition, we measure the market efficiency using the total profit generated from buyers and sellers (see Figure  11 ). The total profit eventually decreases with increasing numbers of p-strategy agents, as the market becomes inefficient due to strategic misrepresentation of p-strategy agents (and therefore missed opportunities of matches).
The total profit, however, does not decrease as sharply as one might expect due to the inherent inefficiency of the UMDL auction mechanism (it in fact increases slightly up to Session 4). If an auction waits for the bids from all agents and decides on the most efficient clearing, inefficiency due to the auction mechanism may not occur. However, this kind of periodic, clearing-house style double auction is unrealistic for the UMDL system where the participants of the auction change and matches should be made quickly.
We conjecture that having strategic sellers poses interesting tradeoffs between strategic inefficiency and surplus extraction. By misrepresenting their true costs, the strategic sellers miss out on possible transactions. By anticipating the future arrival of buyers, on the other hand, they are able to seize more surplus.
Lessons Learned
A conventional way of designing a system that exhibits certain properties is to engineer it. Incentive engineering, however, is unsuccessful in developing the UMDL system because of its complexity and dynamics. Instead, by making the p-strategy available to the agents, we have studed the effects of strategic agents in the UMDL system.
We summarize the following observations. First, although a self-interested agent in the UMDL system has the capability of complex strategic reasoning, our experiments show that such reasoning is not always beneficial. As shown in Figure 8 , the advantage of being smart decreases with the arrival of equally smart agents.
Second, if all the other agents use the p-strategy, an agent with a simple strategy (e.g., fixed markup) can do just as well, while incurring less overhead to gather information and compute bids. An agent may want to switch between a complex strategy and a simple one depending on the behavior of other agents. As the overhead of complex reasoning becomes more costly, an adaptive strategy that dynamically decides on which strategy to use will be more desirable.
Third, we expect the UMDL is likely to evolve to a point where some agents use simpler strategies while some use more complex strategies that use more knowledge (such as the p-strategy). It follows from the above observation that if enough other agents use complex reasoning, an agent can achieve additional profit even when it continues using a simple strategy.
Finally, the market efficiency of the UMDL (represented by the total profit) will not decrease as sharply as one might expect. As shown in Figure 11 , having multiple p-strategy agents increases the market efficiency slightly up to a certain point. Moreover, the profit-seeking behavior of self-interested agents will keep the UMDL agent population mined with agents of various strategies. Even though the market efficiency eventually decreases with the increase in the number of p-strategy agents, because of its mixed agent population, the UMDL will not suffer market inefficiency of the worst case.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have used the p-strategy to examine the collective behavior of strategic agents in the UMDL system. In particular, we have examined market and allocation efficiency with varying numbers of p-strategy agents.
The findings are useful to both system designers and agent designers. It is reassuring from the system designers' viewpoints that the market efficiency of the UMDL does not decrease as sharply as one might expect and that the worst-case market inefficiency is less likely to be realized (since even though self-interested agents have the capability of complex strategic reasoning, not all of them will behave so). At present, we cannot determine the exact demographics of the agent population for the best market efficiency, but we are continuing experiments on many different types of agent populations to get a better understanding of the overall system behavior.
From the allocation-efficiency perspective, on the other hand, agent designers learn that using the p-strategy does not always pay off and that a simple strategy is sometimes as effective. We are currently developing an adaptive pstrategy to dynamically determine when to use the pstrategy and when not to. An adaptive p-strategy will be beneficial not only to a self-interested agent but also to the overall system efficiency.
